

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

THE BDJ PROJECT

1. The Bund Deutsche Jugend or League of German Youth was established by Paul Egon Lueth in early 1950 as a youth group that would rally German youth to the cause of western democracy and combat Communism. Lueth approached the U.S. High Commission and requested support for his plans, which included the activation of an underground network in eastern Germany. The HICOG officials felt that this type of activity could be better handled by a covert intelligence agency and placed Lueth in contact with a CIA representative.

2. Under CIA guidance, the League of German Youth was developed as a large-scale propaganda organization. Its first major campaign was a series of operations directed against the Soviet Zone elections which were held in the fall of 1950. The League, itself, functioned as a CIA mechanism for psychological warfare from the summer of 1950 up until the disclosures which took place in October 1952.

3. During that time, it conducted active campaigns on behalf of the Schumann Plan, on West German integration into western Europe, and in support of other U.S. policy objectives. Its major effort was concentrated on the exposure and negation of the Communist propaganda efforts. In addition, it took a decided stand against the revival of national socialism or any other form of rightist totalitarianism in Germany and Europe.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 25X2P  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

This document is part of an integrated  
file. If separated from the file it must be  
subjected to individual systematic review.

**SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

4. As a result of the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950, the Department of Defense placed maximum value on the immediate creation of retardation forces in all forward areas, including western Germany. The State Department, in a policy paper, recommended that all groups that could contribute to resistance efforts should be contacted.

5. CIA, in its search for a suitable resistance potential, reviewed the possibilities that were presented by the League of German Youth and developed an organizational plan to separate suitable stay-behind assets and personnel from the League. These latter were to be developed as a separate clandestine unit for sabotage and guerrilla warfare operations.

6. The initial phase of this plan called for the spotting and recruitment of regional leaders for each governmental district in Germany and for the training of indigenous instructors. At a later date, additional personnel were to be recruited as stay-behind units. U.S. High Commissioner McCloy was informed of these plans during the developmental stages.

7. In January 1951, the principal agent, who had severed his official connections with the League of German Youth, had spotted three men in each land as the top cadre for his organization. He was given his first assignment which was a collection effort to gather information on certain Soviet Zone airfields that were of great interest to the U.S. Air Force.

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

This document is part of an integrated  
plan. If separated from the plan it must be  
subjected to individual systematic review

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-3-

8. During the spring of 1951, arrangements were made to train the indigenous instructors at the Grafenwoehr Training Area of the U.S. Army. In July 1951, after about forty German leaders and instructors had been trained, instructions were issued by the home office to reassess the security and feasibility of the operation and to discontinue all training in U.S. Army installations.

9. During this stand-by period, a review of the policies and operations of the project was initiated in Washington. This culminated in the dispatch to the field of a new policy on the BDJ Apparat in December 1951. The field was advised that no large-scale preparations for guerrilla warfare or other types of stay-behind should be undertaken without the knowledge and cooperation of the West German Government. The field was also requested to review the present status of the BDJ Apparat with this in mind and to restrict its activities to a limited "hedge" operation. If this could not be done successfully, it was recommended that the operation be terminated.

10. After a careful review of the operations, the field came to the conclusion that continued operations were not feasible and ordered that the project be terminated in the spring of 1952. Operational phase-out was initiated in May 1952 and had been completed by September 1952.

11. On 13 September, the Hessian police raided the homes of the CIA staff agent and the German principal agents and recovered certain classified information which these persons had failed to destroy. In a number of successive meetings, the U.S. High Commissioner Reber and the

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

This document is part of an integrated  
file. If separated from the file, it must be  
subjected to individual systematic review.

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

-4-

Chief of the German Mission, General Truscott, attempted to dissuade Hessian Minister President Zinn and the federal SPD Chairman, Dr. Ollenhauer, from any action that would embarrass the U.S. Government, but these negotiations failed.

12. Zinn made public his charges against the BDJ Apparat on 8 October 1952 in a speech before the Hessian Landtag. The statements made by the U.S. High Commission at that time admitted that U.S. support had been given to the preparations for stay-behind activities by the paramilitary group, but disclaimed any knowledge of internal political activities, including the Zinn charges that a number of prominent SPD officials were to be liquidated.

13. On 23 October 1952, Minister President Zinn agreed to the terms of reference for a joint U.S.-German Committee of Inquiry, which would examine the evidence produced by the police investigations. This Committee functioned until the 31st of October, when the U.S. member objected to the omission of pertinent facts from the protocol prepared by the German Committee Chairman. These omissions of certain testimony reflected the effort of the Commission Chairman to substantiate the original Zinn charges. The German Chairman of the Committee refused to recognize the U.S. member's objections and the hearings were broken off.

14. Thereupon, additional consultations were held between the U.S. High Commission and the German representatives. It was agreed to suspend the work of the joint Commission pending the outcome of the investigation by the office of the West German Federal Prosecutor.

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

-5-

15. Investigation by the German Federal Prosecutor, as far as it can be ascertained, has borne out the findings of the U.S. member of the joint Commission. That is, there is no evidence to support Zinn's charge that the lists compiled by the Apparat were to be used for the liquidation of prominent SPD officials in time of war.

16. The paramilitary group did discuss the question of taking prisoners during a German warfare campaign and also the need for liquidation of all traitors or informants within their own groups in wartime. This, however, was entirely different from the charge that they had prepared liquidation lists or that they would liquidate the persons named in these various lists in the event of Soviet aggression.

17. It should be pointed out that the Apparat did prepare a list of over 1,000 Communists, which was subsequently turned over to CIC for exploitation. It was understood that the known Communists on these lists would be dealt with by the Allied troops in the event of Soviet aggression.

18. On 13 November 1952, the Federal Prosecutor released from custody all BDJ Apparat members with the statement that there was no evidence of illegal activity on their part. Subsequently, the Hessian Government requested the West German Government to ban the League of German Youth, itself, throughout the entire Federal Republic on the basis that the League was tied in with the Apparat's paramilitary activities. Public identification of the Apparat's activities with the League of German Youth seems to have been a primary objective of Minister President Zinn

This document is part of an integrated  
and coordinated from the file it must be  
subject to individual systematic review.

**SECRET**  
Security Information

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
-6-

and his Social Democratic associates. When the Federal Government stated that the banning of organizations was a matter for the states to decide, the Hessian Government banned the League of German Youth. The Land Governments of Hamburg, Bremen and Lower Saxony have taken similar action.

19. The former Federal leaders of the League have been charged by the Hessian Government and will be examined on 2 February 1953 by the investigation judge of the Land Court.

20. The attached cable summarizes the latest developments.

28 January 1953  
Attachment

This document is part of an Integrated  
File. It is classified "Secret" and must be  
controlled by individual systematic review.

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION